論文 - 藤木　剛康

「債務の罠」を越えて : 一帯一路と国際開発援助レジーム

河﨑 信樹, 藤木 剛康 (担当区分： 責任著者 )

関西大学経済論集   74 ( 1 ) 1 - 16   2024年06月

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ロシア・ウクライナ戦争と国際秩序――アメリカの覇権と2つの地域秩序

藤木 剛康

現代中国研究   ( 52 ) 3 - 20   2024年03月  [招待有り]

ロシア・ウクライナ戦争と米中大国間競争——「3つの世界」に臨む「2つの世界」論

藤木剛康

経済理論   ( 412 ) 19 - 32   2023年03月  [招待有り]

混沌の中のコンセンサス―—「労働者のための通商政策」とはなにか

藤木 剛康

和歌山大学経済学会 研究年報   ( 26 )   2022年09月

米中大国間競争とアメリカの通商政策 ――米中デカップリング論を越えて

藤木剛康

国際経済 ( The Japan Society of International Economics )  ( 74 ) 1 - 23   2022年07月  [招待有り]

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始まりの国際関係論—―中国学派の批判的検討

藤木剛康

経済論叢   196 ( 2 ) 23 - 37   2022年04月  [招待有り]

中間層外交はナラティブたりうるか ――新型コロナウイルス感染拡大とアメリカ外交の再構築

藤木 剛康

和歌山大学経済学会 研究年報   ( 25 ) 13 - 30   2021年09月

インド太平洋地域の台頭——地域形成の論理の変貌

藤木剛康

研究年報   ( 24 ) 1 - 25   2020年09月

マーシャルプランと一帯一路ーーアクターとガバナンスの観点から

藤木剛康

グローバル・ガバナンス   ( 6 ) 70 - 86   2020年03月  [査読有り]

トランプ政権の通商政策——コンセンサスの破壊と無秩序状態の政策プロセス

藤木剛康

国際経済 ( The Japan Society of International Economics )  ( 71 ) 145 - 168   2020年  [査読有り]

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リベラルな国際秩序とトランプ政権の国家安全保障戦略 : 普遍主義からの二重の「撤退」

藤木 剛康

和歌山大学経済学会研究年報 ( 和歌山大学経済学会 )  ( 22 ) 1 - 21   2018年

　概要を見る

The liberal international order is in crisis. Despite it having been the common ground of U.S. diplomacy since the end of World War 2, President Donald Trump is attacking policies and institutions based on the principle of a liberal international order under his "America First" approach to foreign policy. This paper arranges and analyses both the dispute on the liberal international order and the debate on President Trump's national security strategy. In the first section, the author studies the concept, causes of the crisis, threats to the liberal international order, and perspectives thereon. It is a grand project to promote freedom, democracy, and market economics around the world. However, the expansion project is viewed as having failed as a result of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq being confronted by serious and protracted partisan politics and civil war, with the expansion of membership making cooperation among member states difficult. Universalism has been revealed to be undermining itself. In the second section, the author analyzes the internal division between "the economic nationalists" and "the traditional globalists" within the foreign policy team of the Trump administration. While both factions are retreating from the universalism of U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war era, they are at odds with each other in terms of world views and priorities. On one hand, the former group overlooks geostrategic competition with authoritative states and prioritizes bilateral trade negotiations with major nations. In contrast, the traditional globalists focus on geostrategic competition with China and Russia and attempt to defend the liberal international order as a limited version. The Trump administration loses consensus on its foreign policy and leaves dissensus as it is.

アメリカと中国の地域秩序構想 : 東アジア地域主義の台頭と変貌 (石橋貞男教授 追悼号)

藤木 剛康

経済理論 = The Wakayama economic review ( 和歌山大学経済学会 )  ( 384 ) 15 - 33   2016年06月

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ポスト冷戦期アメリカの通商政策 : 自由化合意の弱体化と通商政策の進化

藤木 剛康

経済理論 = The Wakayama economic review ( 和歌山大学経済学会 )  ( 379 ) 1 - 20   2015年03月

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和歌山大学経済学部における教育成果の可視化に向けた提言

藤木 剛康

和歌山大学経済学会研究年報 ( 和歌山大学 )  18   111 - 118   2014年09月

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アメリカの通商政策と自由貿易体制の将来 : 覇権安定論の妥当性 (大泉英次教授 鈴木裕範教授 退任記念特集号)

藤木 剛康

経済理論 = The Wakayama economic review ( 和歌山大学 )  376 ( 376 ) 53 - 67   2014年06月

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人民元問題の政治経済学 : 経済的相互依存はどのように管理されたのか(2)

藤木 剛康

経済理論 = The Wakayama economic review ( 和歌山大学 )  373 ( 373 ) 1 - 16   2013年09月

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人民元問題の政治経済学 : 経済的相互依存はどのように管理されたのか(1)

藤木 剛康

経済理論 = The Wakayama economic review ( 和歌山大学 )  372 ( 372 ) 1 - 12   2013年06月

オバマ政権のアジア基軸戦略 : その背景と展望 (特集 オバマ政権の対外政策をどうみるか : 外交政策・援助政策・日本への示唆)

藤木 剛康, フジキ タケヤス, Takeyasu Fujiki

立教アメリカン・スタディーズ = Rikkyo American Studies ( 立教大学アメリカ研究所 )  ( 35 ) 57 - 72   2013年03月

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南シナ海問題をめぐる国際関係の構図(2009~2012年) : 東アジア地域主義の変容

藤木 剛康

和歌山大学経済学会研究年報 ( 和歌山大学 )  17 ( 17 ) 1 - 30   2013年

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アメリカの通商政策と中国のWTO加盟――対中関与政策とは何か

藤木剛康

歴史と経済 ( 政治経済学・経済史学会 )  53 ( 210 ) 32 - 46   2011年  [査読有り]

　概要を見る

By the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War, the Clinton administration reviewed its China policy and introduced a new framework, that of Comprehensive Engagement. Under the Comprehensive Engagement framework the US government negotiated continuously and simultaneously three important issues, the military, the economy, and human rights, in order to integrate China into international society. But Republican conservative and Democratic liberal factions of Congress opposed and delayed the Clinton administration's China policy. The former expressed concern over the rise of China in East Asia, while the latter noted human rights violations in China. Moreover, various interest groups intervened in the policy process with their demands. They criticized the Clinton's Comprehensive Engagement for its appeasing stance, the lack of strategic and long term consideration, and its mainly economic focus. As a result, Clinton's Comprehensive Engagement was frequently criticized as being ad hoc and inconsistent, because US China policy was distorted by the diffusion of political issues and the strong influence of domestic politics after the Cold War. This paper analyzes the policy process of the US-China agreement on China's WTO accession, which is the most important result of Comprehensive Engagement, and a bill granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China, which is a precondition of the former. This process is examined from two points of view. One is the external aspect: negotiations with the Chinese government. The US tried to promote democracy and a market economy in China through accession negotiations with China. Another is the internal aspect: intervention of economic interests in the policy process and bargaining between the administration and Congress. In domestic politics, the Clinton administration needed to bundle the various interests of Congress into one integrated policy: Comprehensive Engagement. The House and Senate, Republican controlled since 1995, were able to restrain implementation of the Clinton administration's policies. In conclusion, this paper shows the consistency of the Clinton administration's Comprehensive Engagement and that there was an agreement between the Clinton administration and Republican leaders.

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